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VOLUME VI

1971

NUMBER 2

In light of the holding of the California Supreme Court in Gerhard
v. Stephens that an incorporeal interest in oil and gas of fee simple
duration can be abandoned, the effect of this decision on the oil and
gas industries in California and possible steps to protect the industries'
holdings are examined. Conceding that the policy of clearing titles
and promoting development is advanced by the court's utilization of
the rationale of the common law doctrine of abandonment, the author
suggests that the uncertainty generated from this decision should be
eliminated by legislative measures to clear land titles of uncertain
mineral rights.

THE GERHARD DOCTRINE OF
ABANDONMENT--OUTLOOK FOR
CALIFORNIA'S OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY
Franklin D. Dodge*

T

California Supreme Court decision in the above mentioned case holding that drilling rights for oil and gas
can be abandoned presents possible future difficulties to the
oil and gas industry in California. The common law doctrine
of abandonment provided the court with a tool for serving
the rationale for its decision, i.e. "the very useful purpose
of clearing title to land of mineral interests of long standing,
the existence of which may impede exploration or development of the premises by reason of difficulty of ascertainment
of present owners or of difficulty of obtaining the joinder of
HE

owners. " 1

The questions raised by this decision are: what effect will
the court's classification of a reserved mineral interest, or a
conveyed mineral interest, as an incorporeal hereditament
subject to abandonment have on large mineral interests held
Copyright 0 1971 by the University of Wyoming
1965, Stanford University; J.D. 1969, University of Texas, Member of
*A.B.

Texas State and American Bar Associations, Attorney for Union Oil Company of California in Los Angeles, California.
1. Gerhard v. Stephens, 442 P.2d 162, 69 Cal. Rptr. 612, 31 Oil & Gas Rep. 28,
46 (1968).
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by oil and gas companies? What will be required in the way of
an examination of oil and gas lease titles prior to commencement of drilling? If as a result of this decision, all mineral interests are vulnerable, what steps can be taken to overcome
any presumption of abandonment?
Real property includes not only the surface of the ground,
but also almost everything attached to the surface and everything above and below it. Thus, the owner of real property
owns all solid minerals in place below the surface of the
ground, such as sand, gravel, coal, ores and the like.2
It is possible to sever the ownership of the subsurface
from that of the surface by a grant of the subsurface or by
a conveyance of the surface with the grantor reserving the
subsurface ownership.' Upon the separation of the surface
and the subsurface ownerships, there are "two separate fee
simple estates in the land, each of which has the same status
and rank." ' The subsurface owner has all the usual rights and
benefits of real property including, by implication, the right
to enter upon the surface of the land to extract and remove
minerals.5
As with minerals, the right to extract oil and gas can be
conveyed separately from the surface ownership or the property owner can convey the surface and reserve the drilling
rights.' However, oil and gas are peculiar minerals because
they possess peculiar attributes, not common to other minerals,
in that they have a disposition to wander or percolate and to
2. See generally, 2 MILLER & STARR, CURRENT LAW OF CALIFORNIA REAL
ESTATE § 300 (1968). See also CALIFORNIA CIV. CODE §§ 829 & 659.
3. Callahan v. Martin, 3 Cal. 2d 110, 43 P.2d 788 (1935) ; Greenleaf v. S. A.
Camp, Ginning Co., 150 Cal. App. 2d 385, 309 P.2d 943 (1957); Renshaw
v. Happy Valley Water Co., 114 Cal. App. 2d 521, 250 P.2d 612 (1952).
4. Foss v. Central Pacific R.R. Co., 9 Cal. App. 2d 117, 49 P.2d 292 (1935).
See Scadden Flat Gold Mining Co. v. Scadden 121 Cal. 33, 53 P. 440 (1898).
See also Nevada Irrigation District v. Keystone Copper Corp. 224 Cal.
App. 2d 523, 527, 20 Oil & Gas Rep. (1964). See generally 2 Miller & Starr,
eupra note 2, at Section 440.
5. Callahan v. Martin, supra note 3; Yuba Investment Co. v. Yuba Consolidated Gold Fields, 184 Cal. 469, 194 P. 19 (1920); Clark v. Dunal, 15 Cal.
85 (1860); Wetzel v. Superior Court, 119 Cal. App. 2d 703, 260, P.2d 242
(1953); Smpardos v. Piombo Construction Co., 111 Cal. App. 2d 415, 244
P.2d 435 (1952).
6. Dabney-Johnston Oil Corp. v. Walden, 4 Cal.2d 637, 52 P.2d 237 (1935);
Standard Oil Co. v. John P. Mills Organization, 3 Cal.2d 128, 43 P.2d 797
(1935): Callahan v .Martin, supra note 3, Carlson v. Lindauer, 119 Cal.
App.2d 292, 259 P.2d 925 (1953). See also 146 A.L.R. 880, 29 A.L.R. 586,
7 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 399 (1960).
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escape from underneath one part of the surface of the earth
to another.7 For this reason, the law in California is that the
owner of land does not have absolute title to oil and gas in place
as corporeal real property, but rather has a property right in
the exclusive right to drill on his property for those substances In the case of Gerhardv. Stephens9 it was stated that
an owner may not effectively transfer rights in property
greater than those he himself is able to enjoy; thus under a
deed by which the grantors purported to convey their entire
interest in the oil, gas and other hydrocarbons underlying
certain property, the grantees received no title to the oil and
gas as corporeal real property, but rather, obtained the exclusive privilege of drilling for such substances, which right
was a profit a prendre, an incorporeal hereditament.
Thus, where oil companies own title to land in fee simple
and subsequently convey the surface estate reserving the drilling rights to themselves, the oil company is left with a profit
a prendre. True, the recordation of such a deed reserving oil
and gas to the grantor is constructive notice of the rights of
the grantor to a subsequent purchaser or encumbrancer of the
real property. ° But, according to Gerhardthis interest being
an incorporeal hereditament or interest in land is subject to
abandonment. Similarly the conveyance of a right to drill separate from the surface ownership is a profit a prendre which is
an estate in real property in the nature of an incorporeal hereditament," and being such would likewise be subject to abandonment.
In addition to a conveyance or a grant with a reservation
of the right to drill, this right can also be given by an oil and
gas lease which permits the lessee to drill for oil and gas upon
7. Callahan v. Martin, supra note 3.
8. People v. Associated Oil Co., 211 Cal. 93, 294 P. 717 (1930); Callahan v.
Martin, supra note 3; Dabney-Johnston Oil Corp. v. Walden, supra note 6;
La Laguna Ranch Co. v. Dodge, 18 Cal. 2d 132, 114 P.2d 351, 135 A.L.R. 546
(1941); Tanner v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 20 Cal. 2d 814, 129 P.2d 383
(1942); Berstein v. Bush, 29 Cal. 2d 773, 177 P.2d 913 (1947); Caffrey v.
Fremin, 198 Cal. App. 2d 176, 17 Cal. Rptr. 668 (1961).
9. Gerhard v. Stephens, supra note 1.
10. Callahan v. Martin, supra note 3.
11. People v. Associated Oil Co., supra note 8; Callahan v. Martin, supra note 3;
Dabney-Johnston Oil Corp. v. Walden, supra note 6; La Laguna Ranch Co.
v. Dodge, supra note 8; Tanner v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., supra note 8;
Berstein v. Bush, supra note 8; Caffrey v. Fremin, supra note 8; Wall v.
Shell Oil Co., 209 Cal. App. 2d 504, 25 Cal. Rptr. 908 (1962); Renshaw v.
Happy Valley Water Co. supra note 3.
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certain property. An oil and gas lease12 or an assignment of
such a lease"3 is almost always recorded by oil companies and
upon recordation, it imparts constructive notice of the lease to
subsequent purchasers and encumbrancers of the real property. However, this leasehold interest is also an incorporeal
hereditament 4 and the California courts have held that
"Abandonment will more readily be found in the case of oil
and gas leases than in most other instances." "
Thus it appears that regardless of which of these methods
is utilized to obtain an interest in the mineral rights of any
land in California, under the Gerhard doctrine, the holder
of such interest holds no more than a servitude, or right in
the land of another," which is not a possessory interest. The
fundamental distinction between corporeal and incorporeal
interests lies in the fact that the former is possessory and the
latter is not ;17 a nonpossessory interest such as the profits a
prendre discussed herein therefore is an incorporeal hereditament and consequently, according to the California Supreme
Court, subject to abandonment."
As was pointed out above, where an oil company grants
the surface estate and reserves the subsurface estate, or is
conveyed the subsurface estate separately, there are two separate fee simple estates in the land," and a fee simple estate
to which a perfect legal title is had, being a corporeal heredita12. Cal. Civ. Code § 1219.
13. La Laguna Ranch Co. v. Dodge, supra note 8; Callahan v. Martin, supra
note 3; Brown v. Capp, 105 Cal. App. 2d 1, 232 P.2d 868 (1951).
14. Callahan v. Martin, supra note 3.
15. Hall v. Auger, 82 Cal. App. 594, 549 (1927), Romero v. Brewer, 58 Cal.
App. 2d 759, 763 (1943) See also Wallace v. Imberton, 197 Cal. App. 2d
392, 17 Cal. Rptr. 117, 150 Oil & Gas Rep. 439 (1960) finding that a lease
had been extinguished by abandonment.
The interest granted by a lessor to a lessee in an oil and gas lease should
not be confused with the incorporeal mineral interests of fee simple duration, i.e., profits a prendre, discussed herein. See generally, 1 WILLIAMS &
MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW, §§ 202 & 205.2 (1964); 36 CAL. JuR. 2d
§ 131-135 (1957). Many of the principles mentioned herein may find application to leasehold interests, however, such interests are not the specific
consideration of this article.
16.

DIGBY, THE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, 181-182 (5th Ed. 1897).

17.

SUMMERS, OIL AND GAS § 51 at 165 (1927). For contrasting views as to
the distinction between corporeal and incorporeal interests, see 1 WILLIAMS
& MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 209 (1964).

18. Callahan v. Martin, supra note 3, at 118; Schiffman v. Richfield Oil Co.,
8 Cal. 2d 211, 233 (1937), see also, 3 PowELL, REAL PROPERTY § 423 at note
91 (1952).
19. Supra note 2.
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ment, is not subject to abandonment." In these types of
transactions, Gerhardwould seem to present no problem to oil
companies since a corporeal interest is involved.21 Rather, it
is where the oil company is conveyed, or has conveyed the surface estate and merely reserved, the "exclusive right to drill"
in the "mineral rights therein" or "all oil, gas and other
hydrocarbons" that the problem arises for it is in these types
of transactions that abandonment incorporeal interests are
created.22
Many oil companies hold incorporeal mineral interests
in California lands for speculation or investment purposes.
The drilling of oil wells requires a great expenditure of capital and the expected returns from successful drilling efforts
must be sufficient to offset the expected costs to the oil company of drilling a certain number of dry holes. Thus many
companies will purchase certain lands or the mineral rights
therein which on geological data available to them appear to
contain valuable oil and gas deposits, but may not do any actual
exploration or other activities until this expense can be accommodated in the company's exploration budget. It can be seen
that many operators, especially the major companies have
more land under lease than they can explore, consequently the
reason for farmout agreements and dry hole and bottom hole
letters.2" It has been argued that because of such practices
some lands which may be potentially mineral-rich are burdened with dormant mineral rights owned by oil companies
which, as the court pointed out in Gerhardmay unnecessarily
burden the exploration of natural resources and thereby thwart
the demands of a modern economic order.24 The court stated
that a ruling that incorporeal hereditaments of the type involved herein may be abandoned "reduces the possibility of
the resurrection of the ghosts of abandoned claims by which
20. 1. C.J.S. Abandonment § 5c, at 13 (1936).
21. In Gerhard v. Stephens, supra note 1, at 35-38, the court points out the
distinction between corporeal and incorporeal hereditaments. See also 21
Stan. L. Rev. 1227, 1234 (1969).
22. An owner of all the mineral rights to certain property could presumably
abandon the oil and gas but not the solid minerals. 21 Stan. L. Rev. aupra
note 21 at 1235; See Gerhard v. Stephens, supra note 1, at 59. See also
Nevada Irr. Dist. v. Keystone Copper Corp., supra note 4 at 527. (quartz,
gold and silver deposits.)
23. 1 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 17 at § 103.
24. Gerhard v. Stephens, supra note 1 at 48.
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title searchers and forgotten owners collect the windfalls of
accidental profit usually attained through another party's
efforts.'""
In response to this need to protect the public interest
several states have enacted statutes providing for such termination.2 6 Several of these statutes provide for the forfeiture
of mineral estates after the expiration of a designated period
of time unless the interests are rerecorded within that period."7
California has enacted no such statutory method of clearing
land titles of uncertain mineral rights, thus it appears the
court in Gerhardhas filled the void by utilizing the doctrine
of abandonment to extinguish such rights.2
The decision in Gerhard is a harbinger of both good and
bad news for California oil companies. The adoption of the
abandonment doctrine reduces the risks faced by a driller in
two significant respects. First, if a long-lost owner of the
mineral rights should present a claim the driller may contend
that the rights had in fact been abandoned, whereas the claimant would automatically prevail on the issue of ownership
in a nonabandonment jurisdiction. Second, if the claimant
does establish ownership the existence of the abandonment
doctrine will facilitate the driller's attempt to limit his liability to good faith damages. He may claim reliance upon
probable abandonment, a defense that could not be made in a
nonabandonment jurisdiction.2 9 This alleviates somewhat
the often difficult task of oil and gas lease title examinations
prior to drilling on lands where there are possible unknown interests. Unfortunately, however, the abandonment doctrine is
a double-edged sword. For when the oil and gas company is
the mineral-rights owner, its interest is subject to divestment
if the requisite elements of abandonment are present.
The elements involved in the abandonment of a right in
property are the voluntary relinquishment thereof by its
owner with the intention of terminating his ownership, pos25. Id. at 48.

LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 789 (1952); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art 3546 (1953);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 64-704 (Supp.1968). VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-154 & 55-155.
27. IND. ANN. STAT. § 56-1101 to 1110 (Supp. 1968) (50 years); MIcE. STAT.
ANN. § 26.1163 (1) (Supp. 1968) (20 years); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 893.15
26.

(1966) (30 years).
28. See STAN. L. REv.supra note 21 at 1233, et seq.
29. Id. at 1234.
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session and control and without vesting ownership in another
person." Intent to abandon is generally a question of fact ;1
an owner must intend to forego all further conforming uses of
his property, and the trier of fact must find the conduct demonstrating the intent "so decisive and conclusive as to indicate
a clear intent to abandon. 3 2 Intent may be inferred from
conduct" and may be implied in appropriate cases from long
continued non-user8 Under the common law, any title to or
interest in land other than a fee simple may be abandoned."
In the case of an easement or profit a prendre, it being
an easement in essence, it is a general rule that in order to
constitute an abandonment, there must be non-user accompanied by unequivocal and decisive acts on the part of the
dominant tenant, e.g., an oil company, clearly showing an intention to abandon. 7 The abandonment depends solely upon
the acts and intentions of the owner of an easement, for it is
he who abadons the easement. 8 Intent, however, is an element
which alludes definition and consequently suspends mineral
rights owners such as oil and gas companies in a limbo of
uncertainty. Indeed, it may be felt that contrary to their intent, oil companies may lose their mineral rights in lands
merely by non-user itself.
For this reason it is helpful to know that while non-user
alone does not extinguish the easement, a long continued non" It is essenuser is some evidence of an intent to abandon.
tially a negative element of abandonment for continued user
0
irrefutably establishes the absence of the concurrent intent."
1 C.J.S. Abandonment, § 1, at 4 (1936).
Wiltsee v. Utley, 79 Cal. App. 2d 71, 77, 179 P.2d 13, 17 (1947).
Smith v. Worn, 93 Cal. 206, 213 (1892).
1 C.J.S. supra note 30 § 4, at 12.
3 Powell supra note 18.
1 C.J.S. supra note 30 § 4, at 12.
Gerhard v. Stephens, supra note 1 at 46.
People v. Southern Pasific Co., 172 Cal. 692, 700 (1916).
Lake Merced Golf & Country Club v. Ocean Shore R.R. Co., 206 Cal. App. 2d
421, 437 (1962).
39. Home R.E. Co. v. Los Angeles Pac. Co., 163 Cal. 710, 714 (1912). See e.g.
Lake Merced Golf & Country Club v. Ocean Shore R.R. Co., supra note 32
at 436-437; Ocean Shore R.R. Co. v. Doelger, 179 Cal. App. 2d 222, 232
(1960); Flanagan v. San Marcos Silk Co., 106 Cal. App. 2d 458, 463 (1951).
Nonuser need not extend over any substantial period of time. (Cf. Flanagan
v. San Marcos Silk Co., supra at 460, 463).
40. See Moon v. Rollins, 35 Cal. 333, 333-339 (1868); RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY §§ 504, con.d; see also Ocean Shore R.R. Co. v. Doelger, supra note
39 at 232; Conn. v. San Pedro, 103 Cal. App. 496, 500 (1930).

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
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The Restatement points out that "Non-use does not of itself
produce an abandonment no matter how long continued. It
but evidences the necessary intention. Its effectiveness as evidence is dependent upon the circumstances." 4 " Thus it must
fairly be shown that non-user by lessee is coupled with an intent to relinquish all rights in the premises ;42 and the intention
with which an act is done is a question of fact, to be determined
by the trial court or jury from a consideration of the conduct
of the party and the surrounding circumstances. 3
Oil companies may ask what type of conduct is necessary
to negate the inference that there is an intent to abandon
manifested. Responding to this query with the statement that
it is a question of fact to be determined by a trial court or
jury offers little solace. What steps are necessary to protect
vulnerable mineral interests? The court in Gerhardfound the
the mineral interest owners' predecessors failed to include
their interests in the estates of those who became deceased.
The mineral interest owners never set foot on the surface of
the land, they never attempted to search for oil nor lease to
others to drill for oil, nor to inquire of the defendants concerning the property nor to demand of them some interest
in the proceeds of oil leases, nor to have their fractional shares
set apart and assessed for tax purposes. The court had to determine whether the trial court could reasonably have found
the necessary intent to abandon on the basis of the plaintiffs'
47 years of non-user, their apparent lack of concern with their
interests, and their failure to give any visible indication of
intent to make future use of the property. 4 Yet, in the light
of all these elements which seem to evidence an intent to
abandon, the court stated in regard to several of the plaintiffs:
In order to protect the owner of an unlimited profit
a prendre or other incorporeal hereditament against
'involuntary' abandonment under circumstances in
which conflicting inferences may be drawn from his
nonuser [sic] we hold that the trial court must find
either that the owner's future use of the right could
41. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY, § 504, com.d; see People v. Ocean Shore R.R.
Co., 32 Cal. 2d 406, 419 (1948).
42. Berry v. Kelly, 90 Cal. App. 2d 486, 203 P.2d 80 (1949).
43. Gerhard v. Stephens, supra note 1 at 51.
44. Id. at 54.
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result only from a palpably unsound business judgment,. ..or that the owner has given a further indication of his intention to abandon.4 5
The court points out that an individual must have his intent judged on a truly subjective standard when dealing with
his business judgment.4 6 The court's emphasis on the standard
to be employed when judging an individual's business judgment implies that when judging a "non individual", such as an
oil and gas company, consideration will not be given to such
elements of subjective intent as personal pride in, and attachment to, property rights which may cause individual owners
to adopt a less functional approcah to the management of his
possessions.
For example, as mentioned previously, oil companies are
not unwont to accumulate vast mineral interest holdings in
land which they feel to be potentially mineral-rich." These
lands are frequently held for speculation, sometimes for very
long periods of time until it is felt the time is opportune to
commence activities. This may occur when there is a sufficient budget to accommodate the activities, or when some
other party has been successful in its endeavors on neighboring land, or when another operator is found who will assume
the cost and risks involved in conducting activities upon the
land for a share in the profits, if any, therefrom. It can readily
be seen that each of these circumstances depend to some degree
upon ''economic exigencies" and "external realities" which
will effect any evaluation of non-user when it is used as evidence of the requisite intent. Thus, it would appear that it
would be extremely difficult to prove the necessary elements
for abandonment, i.e., non-user and intent, in a case against
45. Id. at 55. As to the other plaintiffs' the trial court's finding of abandonment was upheld on the additional evidence that the plaintiff's distributees,
rejected the shares which represented any interest they may have had in
the land together with their inactivity for an extended period of time-almost a half century, Id. at 58.
46. Id. at 55. The court stated that "An extended nonuser, when considered in
light of these 'economic exigencies' and 'external realities' . . . cannot by
itself support the trial court's finding of intent to abandon. Although the
acquisition of such an interest in oil and gas may be entirely speculative
and the owner may well intend to foresake his interest if the 'oil boom'
which induced his purpose collapsed, plaintiffs and their predecessors
incurring no significant detriment by retaining their interest, might well
have contemplated that the property might again become valuable because
of the efforts of others." Id. at 55.
47. Supra at 6.
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an oil and gas company" because its very nature and purpose
is involved with holding mineral interests in land which in its
business judgment is felt to contain oil, gas, or other hydrocarbons, and which, at an opportune time, it intends to exploit.
Certainly this was not the type of inactivity the court in
Gerhardhad in mind when it discussed the objectives of promoting the marketability of titles and fulfilling the demands
of a modern economic order. 9 This is not to say that oil and
gas companies cannot because of their nature and purpose
abandon their mineral interest in land." Rather, it is to say
that the result of this decision imposes no real injury to legitimate interests such as those of the oil and gas industry because
the uncertainty of proving the rather amorphous element of
intent to abandon is on the party who would seek to wrest the
interest away, and, relying on the court's dicta in Gerhard, it
appears that it would be an onerous task for a party to prove
that an oil company has abandoned its mineral interests in
land when considered in light of "economic exigencies" and
"external realities."
Of course, this legal foothold may be felt to be too tenuous
for those who are not disposed to this interpretation of the
court's dicta. There are other methods, theoretically possible
though sometimes impracticable, of safeguarding these valuable interests and which provide a more stable standard on
which to rely.
Severed mineral rights are subject to property taxation.5
The court in Gerhardpoints out that the holding of the case
in no way leaves open the possibility that owners of valuable
property rights will contrary to their desires lose their rights.2
It points out that a conscientious owner of such a right can
fully protect himself by applying for separate assessment.5
See CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 1864 et seq.
49. Gerhard v. Stephens, supra note 1 at 48.
50. Leasehold interest may expressly give the lessee the right to abandon drilling operations under certain circumstances. For instance, the lessee may be
given the right to abandon operations by reason of encountering formations
recognized by geological experience as unfavorable to the production of oil
and gas in paying quantities.
51. CAL. REV. & TAx CODE § 104(6) (West 1956).
52. Gerhard v. Stephens, supra note 1 at 48.
53. Id. at 48; see CAL. REV. & TAX CODE, supra note 51 at § 2803 cf. Smith v.
Anderson, 67 A.C. 646, 652 [26 Oil & Gas Rep. 151] (1967).
48.
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However, assessment of the value of such interests prior
to their discovery is difficult of ascertainment for it is not
known whether minerals are present nor, if there are, in what
quantities." For this reason, some counties do not make any
assessment or taxation on the value of unexploited mineral
estates, or put a zero value on such estates, until such estates
are exploited." Mineral interests in lands which lie within
such counties, utilizing the zero value assessment, could have
a separate valuation made according to the ruling in Smith v.
Anderson," however, since the valuation assessed is zero, it
would appear that until there was exploitation of the mineral
interests there would be no payment of taxes and, consequently
no overt act manifesting an intent not to abandon. On the
other hand, some counties" place a valuation on mineral interest in land as high as ten dollars an acre whether or not
the mineral interests are exploited. To seek a separate valuation for severed minerals in such counties may be so costly
as to be prohibitive. As a result, the owner of the severed
mineral estate in some counties may or may not be identified as
the owner of the mineral rights and may or may not run the
risk of having his claim to such rights extinguished.58 Thus,
the effectiveness of this procedure is rather limited.
The California Supreme Court has said that an interest in
minerals which is recorded gives constructive notice thereof."
But the Gerharddecision qualifies such protection by holding
that the interests may be lost to another party, even though
recorded, if abandonment is found. It would appear that in
order that such an intent to abandon be negated, a procedure
similar to that employed by the aforementioned states, i.e.
rerecordation, could be utilized. Such a rerecording of one's
mineral interest in land could serve a similar purpose by identifying the entity who holds the interest in the land and manifesting a continuing intention to retain such interests.
54. See, e.g. Red Bluff Developers v. County of Tehama, 258 Cal. App. 2d 668,
66 Cal. Rptr. 229 (1968).
55. See, e.g. Nevada Irrigation Dist. v. Keystone Copper Corp., 224 Cal. App. 2d
523, 528, 36 Cal. Rptr. 775, 779 (1964).
56. Supra note 53.
57. E.g., Orange County, California.
58. See 21 Stan. L. Rev. supra note 21, at 1231.
59. Supra note 10.
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California has no statutory authority providing for re-

recording mineral interests in land such as those states mentioned above."0 California requires that there by a statute authorizing or permitting an interest to be placed of record and
giving the recording the effect of constructive notice. 6 ' Recordation of an instrument not entitled to be recorded does

not give constructive notice 2 either of its existence or of its
terms."

Thus, although mineral interests in land acquired by

deed or grant, or a grant with reservation, are recordable and
such recordation gives constructive notice thereof, it is sub-

mitted that since there is no statutory authority for rerecording a mineral interest for the purpose of giving constructive
notice of an intent not to abandon, the utilization of such a
procedure would afford little or no protection to a mineral in-

terest owner. It is not uncommon in practice, however, for
one to rerecord an interest in land. Indeed, instruments are
quite often rerecorded for a myriad of different reasons ranging from inadvertence to the fact that the instrument had
already been recorded properly to curing a defectively recorded instrument. 4 Such acts of rerecordation are given the
same legal effect of constructive notice as an original recording. Since generally it is the purpose of the recording statutes
to impart notice of the contents of the recorded instrument to
third persons, 65 it would appear that a rerecording of a oncerecorded mineral interest together with the filing of a letter of

intent stating the purpose for the rerecording which is generally made a part of the record when a rerecording is made,

would effectively resolve the dilemma of having unidentified
60. Supra at 7.
61. Driefus v. Marx, 40 Cal. App. 2d 461, 104 P.2d 1080 (1940).
62. Mesick v. Sunderland, 6 Cal. 297 (1856); Bank of Ukiah v. Moore, 106 Cal.
673, 39 P. 1071 (1895); Page v. Rogers., 31 Cal. 293 (1866); People v.
O'Brien, 96 Cal. 171, 31 P. 45 (1892); Parkside Realty Co. v. MacDonald,
166 Cal. 426, 137 P. 21 (1913); Henrici v. South Feather Land & Water
Co., 177 Cal. 442, 170 P. 1135 (1918).
63. Black v. Solano Co., 114 Cal. App. 170, 299 P. 843 (1931); McLane v. Van
Eaton, 60 Cal. App. 2d 612, 141 P.2d 483 (1943); Stafford v. Ballinger,
199 Cal. App. 2d 289, 15 Cal. Rptr. 568 (1962).
64. Eg. to correct defects in deeds and other instruments of record which have
been declared to impart notice of subsequent purchasers. Touchard v.
Keyes, 21 Cal. 202 (1862); Wallace v. Moody, 26 Cal. 387 (1864); McMinh
v. O'Connor, 27 Cal. 238 (1865).
65. Chamberlain v. Bell, 7 Cal. 292 (1957); Smith v. Dall, 15 Cal. 510 (1860)
overruled on another point by Dutten v. Werschauer, 21 Cal. 609 (1963);
Hager v. Spect, 52 Cal. 579 (1887); Warnock v. Harlow, 96 Cal. 298, 31
P. 166 (1892); Los Angeles v. Morgan, 105 Cal. App. 2d 726, 234 P.2d
319 (1951).
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entities holding up the marketability of mineral interests,
and also the problem of establishing whether or not there is an
intent to abandon. The rerecordation would be an overt act
manifesting an intent to retain one's rights in land. It would
appear in the chain of title on the record in any title search
and would consequently impart constructive notice to a subsequent purchaser or encumbrancer. It would be difficult to
believe that a court, in the light of such evidence, would hold
that there was an intent to abandon manifested.
As between these two suggested procedures for manifesting an intent not to abandon mineral rights in land, it
would appear that the latter is more feasible. It does not involve as much time, effort or cost and it avoids the uncertainty
of trying to assess unknown minerals which may or may not
be exploited.
A third possible alternative as a solution to this problem
might be the filing of an affidavit similar to those filed on
mining claims. In essence, these affidavits hold ones interest
in minerals by stating that certain work has been performed
or expenditures have been made on the interest, thus evidencing ones efforts to negate an intention to abandon. It would
appear that such affidavits could be filed on mineral interests
reciting therein that it is the intention of the owner to retain
his interest in said land thus, in effect, negating a contrary
finding of abandonment; it would appear on the record
title and impart constructive notice to any subsequent purchaser or encumbrancer. From the standpoint of time, effort
and cost, this alternative is perhaps the most attractive.
SUMMARY

Gerhardv. Stephens seems to be the first California case
actually holding that an incorporeal interest in oil and gas
of fee simple duration can be abandoned. The California Supreme Court adopts by this decision a policy in favor of clearing titles and promoting development by holding that rights to
mineral interests or the exclusive right to drill in the land is
an interest which can, under certain circumstances, be lost
because of a finding of abandonment.
Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1970
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The effect of such a classification of a reversed mineral
interest or a conveyed mineral interest as incorporeal and
therefore subject to abandonment raises such questions for
the oil and gas industry in California as: What is the present
status of large mineral holdings much of which has never had
any activity conducted thereon? What is now required in the
way of oil and gas lease title examinations prior to drilling?
If mineral interests in land are now vulnerable to abandonment, what kind of action can be taken to overcome such a
finding?
It would seem that the oil and gas industry having legitimate business or economic interests in mineral estates in California lands incurred no real injury from the uncertainty of
proving the rather amorphous element of intent to abandon as
set forth by the court in Gerhard. The court employs the
standard of "subjective business judgment" as viewed in the
light of "economic exigencies" and "external realities" to
give definitional boundaries to the allusive element of intent.
By adopting such a standard, it would appear that in a
case in which a party is trying to wrest a mineral interest
from an oil and gas company by utilizing the doctrine of
abandonment, it will be extremely difficult to introduce evidence sufficient to show an intention to abandon. The very
nature and purpose of an oil and gas company requires that
it very often hold mineral interests in land for long periods
of time without conducting any activities. To find that simply
because there has been no activities conducted on mineral interests for thirty (30) or forty (40) years there is an intention to abandon could be contrary to the actual intention of an oil company to retain such lands for speculation
or future activity. An oil and gas company in its subjective
business judgment may decide in the light of present circumstances--economic exigencies and external realities-that the
time is not yet suitable for commencing activities. To attempt
to negate this intention and successfully prove an intention
of abandonment would be an onerous task indeed, and for
this reason it would seem the Gerhard decision results in no
real injury to such legitimate interests in these mineral rights.
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol6/iss2/3
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For those companies which are not prone to rely on such
an interpretation of the court's dicta as it regards the element
of intent, there are several possible alternatives which, if found
to be practicable, could possibly be utilized to prevent a finding of an intention to abandon mineral interests.
The first alternative is to apply for a separate valuation
of one's mineral interest in land as provided in the California
Revenue and Tax Code and which was suggested by the court.
This may not be satisfactory however since there is a great deal
of difficulty in trying to put a valuation on minerals which
have not yet been exploited. Any attempted assessment
could run the gamut of possible valuation from a zero value
to many dollars per acre consequently providing no overt
act to manifest intent or resulting in a prohibitive tax cost.
The second alternative is to rerecord mineral interests
and state as a reason for such rerecordation in the letter of
intent which generally accompanies such a filing that it is the
intention of such act to negate any intention to abandon such
mineral interest. This information would appear on the record
in the chain of title and any subsequent purchacser would
have constructive knowledge of such interest in the land. This
method would cost less and involve less time and probably less
money than the first alternative.
The third alternative is to file an affidavit similar to
those filed on mining claims stating it is the intention of the
mineral interest owner to retain his mineral interest. As with
the second alternative this imparts constructive notice to subsequent purchasers and serves the function of identifying
the party who has interest in the land and resolving the issue
of whether or not this interest has been extinguished. This
alternative would probably be the most favorable when considered in light of time involved, cost incurred and effort that
would have to be expended.
CONCLUSION

Certainly the policy in favor of clearing titles and promoting development is advanced as a result of this case by preventing claims under old mineral estates that were in fact abanPublished by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1970
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doned at an earlier time from being raised. The adoption
of the abandonment doctrine reduces the risks faced by a
driller when he decides to proceed with the exploitation of a
mineral estate which an examination of the oil and gas lease
title evidences to belong to some unknown entity who cannot
be located.
However, the uncertainty generated from this decision
as regards to proving the rather nebulous element of intent
to abandon, leaves such entities as oil and gas companies in
a limbo in two respects. First, where a company decides it
will accept the risk of drilling on a mineral estate where the
mineral interest owner cannot be located and has presumably
abandoned his interest, it is provided with no predictable
cutoff date after which he may drill in safety; whether there
has been an abandonment is a question of fact which will have
to be decided from the circumstances. Second, where the oil
and gas company is the mineral interest owner against whom
abandonment is being charged, it may be that the company
will lose its interest contrary to its desires because of not
knowing what precautions to take in order to negate an intention to abandon.
As has been submitted, the element of uncertainty which
results from the court's adoption of the abandonment doctrine
in incorporeal mineral interest situations may not leave the
outcome of such a suit to rest on as much conjecture as one
might think, however, it is true that it does not provide a predictable standard to rely on such as is found in the aforementioned statutes adopted by some states. Perhaps for this reason, and the resulting fear of the vulnerability of mineral interest, the time is appropriate for legislation on this matter. In
this respect, therefore, it may behoove the California oil and
gas industry to exert whatever influence it may possess in an
effort to have a statutory standard legislated which would set
out clearly and unequivocably what requirements the owner of
an incorporeal mineral interest owner must satisfy in order to
escape vulnerability to their interests due to the Gerharddoctrine of abandonment.
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